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The last three decades of the nineteenth century were a period of decline for 
American whaling.' The market for oil was weak because of  the advance of 
petroleum production, and only the demand for bone kept right whalers and 
bowhead whalers afloat. It was against this background that the Norwegian 
whaling industry  emerged  and grew to formidable  size. Oddly enough,  the 
Norwegians were not after bone-the  whales they hunted, although baleens, 
yielded bone of very poor quality. They were after oil, and oil of  an inferior 
sort. How was it that the Norwegians could prosper,  selling inferior oil in a 
declining market? 
The answer is that their costs were exceedingly low. The whales they hunted 
existed in profusion along the northern (Finnmark) coast of Norway and could 
be caught with a relatively modest commitment of man and vessel time. The 
area from which the hunters came was poor. Labor was cheap; it also happened 
to be experienced in maritime pursuits, particularly in the sealing industry and 
in hunting small whales-the  bottlenose whale and the white whale (narwhal). 
These activities provided men who could readily transfer into whaling; sealing 
provided a style of vessel that could be adapted to the needs of the industry.* 
Once certain technical problems were solved, the Norwegians came to dom- 
1. This chapter is based chiefly on the following books: Bonner 1989; Burton 1983; Crisp 1954; 
2. Jackson 1978, 158; Bonner 1989, 158. Circa 1868 an average Norwegian worker earned the 
Ellis 1991; Jackson 1978; Sanderson 1956; T~nnessen  and Johnsen 1982. 
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Cotton manufacturing hand 
$200 (12 months, with board) 
$499 (when employed) 
$465 (300 days) 
$351-501  (annual) 
$216-300  (12 months, with board) 
$104 (12 months, probably with board) 
$298 (full-time equivalent) 
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inate whaling. Their fleet became the largest in the world, and they provided 
much of the human capital and many of the vessels employed by other whaling 
countries (England, Germany, and, for a time, even Japan). The nationals of 
these countries participated in the industry by investing in whalers, processing 
whale products,  and  developing a marketing  apparatus. Their  participation 
grew more important as the twentieth century wore on, but the captains, the 
seamen, and the vessels of all countries remained typically Norwegian. In these 
respects the Norwegian industry differed importantly from the earlier Ameri- 
can industry. As chapters 5, 8, 9, and 10 show, American whaling fleets were 
financed by local capital, and their products were processed and marketed prin- 
cipally by Americans. After the 183Os, however, the crewmen before the mast 
were increasingly drawn from abroad. These circumstances were certainly not 
characteristic of Norwegian  operation^.^ 
In one respect the two industries were alike-both  were situated in small 
towns, some distance from large, mercantile ports, and whaling dominated the 
towns’ economies. When the industry went into decline, few towns developed 
a second, important industrial life. New Bedford’s successful shift into cotton 
textiles and commercial fishing was unusuaL4 
The technical innovations that revolutionized  whaling appeared over a pe- 
riod of more than seventy years. They included inventions having to do with 
the uses of whale products, as well as those bearing expressly on the hunting 
and processing of  whales.  The first important innovations  changed  hunting 
techniques. 
The whales thronging the Finnmark coast were rorquals: blues,  seis, and 
fins. These creatures are remarkable for their great size, speed, and power. The 
small whaleboats of the conventional industry could rarely approach them; to 
attack them with conventional implements from a whaleboat was a very dan- 
gerous, even a foolhardy, business.5 A harpooned blue or sei or fin could drag 
a boat fast enough to swamp it; a boat that wasn’t swamped could be pulled so 
far so fast that the mother vessel would be unable to find it. The chance of 
killing one of these whales with a hand lance or a bomb lance was infinitesi- 
mally small (Crisp 1954,99-100). 
Woolen manufacturing hand 
Iron and steelworker 
$335 (full-time equivalent) 
$524 (full-time equivalent) 
(Tflnnessen and Johnsen 1982, 12; Lebergott 1964,528, 529, 530,539,541-45). 
3. Hohman (1935) has a good treatment of  the contrasts between the American and Nonve- 
gian fleets. 
4. Like American New Bedford, Norwegian Sandefjord is reminded of its whaling days by  a 
striking statue and a whaling museum. Sandefjord was a major center of the modem industry, but 
the Sandefjord statue commemorates old-style whaling, presumably because a figure wielding 
a handheld harpoon from the bow  of a small boat is more dramatic than a gunner in a steam- 
powered catcher. 
5. “[Olne  entry of  a journal  maintained throughout the  1822 whaling voyage of  a London 
whaler, the Leviathan, noted that several rorquals had been sighted, ‘but they are too formidable to 
attack with safety, and the chance of killing them when struck is very slight”’ (Sanger 1991b, 129). 500  Chapter 13 
There is a report of  three boats from a conventional Scottish steam vessel 
that managed to put three harpoons and many bomb lances into a large blue 
whale. The whale did not slow down, but the men managed to get the lines to 
the steamer. The whale then towed all three boats plus the 340-ton steamer for 
fourteen hours. When the steamer tried to stop the whale by reversing engines, 
the lines broke and the whale escaped.6 
In view of this story, it should come as no surprise that the innovation that 
launched the modern fishery had to do with the initial assault on the whale. It 
was a cannon that threw  a large, explosive harpoon a considerable distance 
with substantial power. The new weapon was intended to kill the whale, or at 
least to wound it very seriously, and to hook it securely. 
The idea of  a harpoon gun was not new. The Greener gun dates to the eigh- 
teenth century (see chapter 7), but it was never widely  adopted. The whales 
hunted at that time-rights  and bowheads-were  easily frightened; they scat- 
tered when the Greener was fired. In part because of the way the harpoon was 
attached to the line, in part because the gunner could not allow for the move- 
ments of the ocean, as a harpooner casting a handheld harpoon could, the gun 
was very inaccurate. Greeners also had a habit of exploding and for that reason, 
if for no other, were unpopular among whalemen.’ 
The new cannon had a much longer range than  the Greener, and threw  a 
larger harpoon carrying a powerful explosive charge.* With it a gunner could 
kill a large rorqual with one well-placed shot; even a harpoon that missed the 
most vulnerable part of a whale might leave it unable to flee. 
Cannons alone did not solve the problems of  the rorqual fishery. An Amen- 
can whaleman, Thomas Welcome Roys-the  captain who opened the Western 
Arctic hunting grounds-perfected  a cannon fully capable of killing the big 
rorquals, and did kill many, but lost most of them. They sank quickly, and Roys 
was unable to recover them.9 
The inventor who completed the first important innovative cycle was a Nor- 
wegian, Svend Foyn. Foyn had developed a workable cannon and harpoon by 
the mid- I860s, and successfully employed them in whaling in 1868. His inno- 
vation had several important features. First, the cannon was not mounted in a 
whaleboat, as the Greener had been, and as Roys’s cannon was. Foyn placed his 
in the bow of a small steam schooner. The ideal Foyn vessel was fast, powerful, 
maneuverable, and virtually unsinkable. By the end of the century Norwegian 
6. Crisp  1954, 107-8:  Burton (1983, 152) tells a slightly different story of the encounter. See 
Sanderson 1956, 31 I, for an equally striking example. 
7. Sanderson 1956, 296. “The gun never found any favour with the whalemen, and in practice 
it appears to have been little better than a hazardous expense” (Crisp 1954, 103). 
8. According to Burton (1983, 156) modern cannon can send an explosive harpoon as much as 
ninety meters, although they are rarely fired at whales that distant. 
9. Roys’s cannon was fired from a whaleboat. On the first voyage in which it was used, “they 
shot a total of fifty-two whales, none of which was saved” (Bonner 1980,226-27). Roys gave up 
his left hand to his work: it was blown off in an accident while he was developing a rocket harpoon 
(Bockstocc 1980, 55). 501  Modern Whaling 
whalers exhibited  all of  these characteristics,  and the whaling  industry  had 
been revolutionized. Sanderson (1956,299-300,  and see 287-92)  describes the 
steamers colorfully. 
These little vessels looked rather like the early steam trawlers and drifters, 
but had flared bows, a lot of sheer, a very low freeboard, and rounded bot- 
toms  to facilitate  rapid  turns.  They rolled,  pitched,  and performed other 
quite inexplicable gyrations in a manner that cannot possibly be described. 
The only thing they almost never did was sink, though they often technically 
foundered  (which means simply going below  the surface) and several  of 
them turned turtle. In both cases, however, they almost always bobbed up 
again, and right side up to boot! 
Jackson (1978, 158-59)  adds: “[Slhe was ‘all engine’. Everything . . . was sac- 
rificed to strength and speed so that she could stalk whales at seven knots and 
then tow them back to the shore base.”’O 
There was still the danger that, if the whale was not killed at the first stroke, 
it would break the harpoon cable and escape. Foyn dealt with this problem in 
two ways. He made the cable exceptionally heavy-five  inches thick-and  he 
devised a system for carrying the cable to the mast, and then down into the 
hold to a series of springs.” When the whale swam off, it was played like a fish 
on a line; the mast and the hold springs (the accumulator) acted in the place 
of the fishing pole, allowing enough give that the cable would not break. 
Finally, the vessel  was outfitted with a steam winch, powerful enough to 
keep the whale from sinking, or to bring it up if it did.I2 In the 1880s a system 
was devised to fill the dead whale with compressed  air, so that it could not 
sink. The body could then be marked with a waif (a floating marker), and the 
catcher could go on with its catching. 
Such a whaler required very little manpower. The captain sailed the vessel 
up to the point of contact with the whale. The engineer then came up from 
below to handle the wheel, and the captain raced across a catwalk (in the later 
designs) from the wheelhouse  to the gun, which was  set on a swivel in the 
bow. It was the captain who manned the gun and shot the whale. The engineer 
maneuvered the vessel, backing off after the harpoon was set, and then, if the 
whale was still alive, accommodating the movements of the vessel to the be- 
havior of the whale. There was no longer a need for the oarsmen who had made 
up the bulk of a New Bedford crew. 
Since the vessel was rarely out for long and since the oil was not tried out 
aboard ship, few technicians  were required.  The crew could be as small as 
10. Foyn’s first vessel was only 86 tons, according to Jackson (1978,  158); Crisp (1954, 105) 
says the early catchers ran less than 40 tons. By the time the industry had transferred to the Antarc- 
tic, catchers were much larger-as  large as 280 tons. 
11. The rigging was more complicated than this account suggests; a winch figured in it. See the 
drawing in Burton 1983, 155. 
12. Bonner 1980,228. Foyn derived his ideas on the winch and the accumulator at least in part 
from Roys and Roys’s partner, Gustavus A. Liliendahl. 502  Chapter 13 
six-counting  the captain, an engineer, a stoker, and a boy to watch from the 
crow’s nest-and  it was never more than a dozen. Crewmen were still needed 
to secure the dead whale and set the small stabilizing sail on the mizzenmast, 
but for little else. As the industry developed and as the Antarctic became the 
principal hunting ground, the catchers became bigger and more powerful. The 
power source shifted from silent steam to noisy diesel, the hunting style neces- 
sarily changed from careful stalking to hard pursuit-to  tire the whale-and 
radios and airplanes enhanced the supply of information at the disposal of the 
catcher captain, but fundamentally the catcher remained the same. 
The modem fishery was a throwback to the hunting conducted around Spits- 
bergen in the seventeenth  century, and on the coast of  New England in the 
early eighteenth  century. That is, whalers  became  purely  catchers,  and  the 
whales were brought back to shore to be processed. The processing initially 
consisted of  the reduction of  blubber to oil, but eventually  techniques were 
developed for cooking and pressing the meat and bones to obtain more oil, and 
then for grinding meat and bones to make fertilizer (guano) and animal feed. 
In the new industry the labor force did not consist chiefly of  seamen, as it 
had in the old industry. Most of the workers were manufacturing employees; 
they processed the carcasses, but never went to sea. The lives of the seamen on 
the catchers also differed from those of the crews of the earlier American whal- 
ers. The original Norwegian catchers were typically at sea for a day at a time, 
rather than the three or four years spent by  vessels in the American fishery. 
Perhaps for that reason, as well as the consistently good catches made in the 
early  years  of  Norwegian  whaling,  risks  were  borne chiefly  by  the  owner. 
Crewmen were paid  a wage  (as were  shore hands); usually  there were also 
performance bonuses, related to the number of whales taken. Large bonuses 
went to the gunner (usually the captain), and smaller ones to the rest of  the 
crew.I3 
The transfer of the processing operations ashore placed a premium on get- 
ting whales back to port quickly, and the premium increased with the innova- 
tion, early in the twentieth century, of techniques for using whale oil to produce 
cooking fats. The oil had to be fresh. Catchers had to reach the station quickly, 
hauling one or two heavy whale carcasses. They had to be powerful and fast, 
and they could not operate very far from the shore station. 
13.1  Expansion beyond Finnmark 
Modem Norwegian whaling began in the waters off Norway; it soon spread 
to other places. Two developments of the early twentieth century hastened its 
dispersal. First, Norwegian herring fishermen had noticed that herrings and fin 
13. As catches declined in the late 1930s due to overhunting, the Norwegian union representing 
the crewmen bargained (successfully) for a redistribution of the compensation package, so that 
more came from fixed wages and less from bonuses. 503  Modern Whaling 
whales appeared together; they surmised that the slaughter of the whales would 
lead to the disappearance of  the hemng.14 They were mistaken but adamant, 
and were joined in their opposition to whaling by other fishermen, by conserva- 
tionists, and by  neighbors of  whale-processing plants, offended by the pollu- 
tion of air and water that resulted from their operations. Following a violent 
period, during which at least one whaling station was  destroyed, legislation 
was passed in 1904 to prohibit whaling off the coasts of Norway.I5  The first 
phase of  modern whaling had come to a close. In  1868-1904  the Finnmark 
whalers had destroyed about eighteen thousand whales (Tonnessen and John- 
sen 1982, 61-68).  The new  equipment had been thoroughly tested and the 
human capital needed to expand the industry had been formed. New grounds 
had to be found, and new shore stations established. 
The second development leading to the dispersal of  the industry was the 
innovation of  the hydrogenation process, invented and widely disseminated 
early in the twentieth century. According to Gordon Jackson (1978, 178) the 
demand of  the soap industry for fats was  expanding so rapidly that conven- 
tional sources were unable to supply the market at stable prices. In addition, 
margarine, introduced in the last third of the nineteenth century, was winning 
large European markets. Hydrogenation converted liquid oils to solid fats that 
could be  used  for both  soap and margarine, and helped eliminate the fat 
shortage. 
In the case of whale oil, hydrogenation produced a white fat with no fishy 
odor or flavor.Ih  Whale oil could therefore pass muster for the margarine indus- 
try.17 The fat melted at low temperatures and for this reason could not be the 
exclusive constituent of margarine, but the problem was overcome by combin- 
ing whale-oil fat with other fats. Hydrogenation opened a new market for the 
products of Norwegian whaling, and in 1929 a further technical development 
permitted the production of good margarine from whale oil alone. The industry 
had been selling chiefly to a narrow market, the Scottish jute industry. The 
opportunities presented by  hydrogenation were very  much richer than those 
offered by Scottish industrialists. 
The output of  whalers now  expanded rapidly, but the price of  whale oil 
14. Icelandic and Norwegian legend tells of a type of whale that drives fish toward the shore 
for man. To Finnmark fishermen the fin whale was the “fish-driver” (Harrison Matthews et al. 
1968, 19). 
15. The prohibition was rescinded within twenty years, as an element in a Norwegian campaign 
to win whaling concessions in the Antarctic from Great Britain (T~nnessen  and Johnsen 1982, 
342). 
16. Sperm oil, which is a kind of wax, not a true oil, cannot be hydrogenated. The markets for 
sperm and whale oil remained entirely separate. This meant that processing plants took only one 
kind of whale at a time. Sperm whales typically were hunted before the rorqual season, and, after 
the cleansing of all the equipment, rorquals would be taken. 
17. There remained resistance  to the use of  whale oil in both margarine and soap, because 
producers feared that consumers would object to it. Consequently, whale oil was generally mixed 
with other oils. By the end of  the 1920s. however, the prejudice had substantially abated. For good 
accounts of these matters, see Jackson 1978, 178-82;  T~nnessen  and Johnsen 1982,228-31. 504  Chapter 13 
drifted upward, following the general price indexes of the Western world in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. The Norwegians organized whaling 
stations around the world-in  Spitsbergen, Iceland, Ireland, the Shetlands, the 
Hebrides, the Faeroes, Labrador, Newfoundland, British Columbia, Japan, Ko- 
rea-wherever  rorquals were to be  found (Crisp  1954, 109; Dickinson and 
Sanger 1990). The northern stations proved to be particularly important, be- 
cause there whalemen learned how to flense and  try out under conditions of 
extreme cold, in the presence of  snow and ice. Knowledge was laid up that 
served them well when the great hunting grounds of the Antarctic were opened. 
Why, under these improved market conditions, didn’t American whaling re- 
vive? Why didn’t Americans join the hunt for rorquals and become again the 
leading whalemen in the world? There seem to be three answers to these ques- 
tions. First, by the time the market for oil had revived, the American whaling 
industry was virtually nonexistent. There was little capital and there were few 
seamen on which to build a new industry. Second, such physical  and human 
capital as existed was ill suited to the requirements of the new industry. The 
American fleet did not contain vessels easily converted into steam catchers, 
and American shipbuilders had a comparative disadvantage in building steel 
steam-powered vessels. American whalemen knew the old hunting techniques; 
they understood the right, bowhead, and sperm whales they had once hunted. 
They did not know the new methods, and they had no experience in finding and 
killing rorquals. Third, margarine was a European product; it did not capture a 
significant share of the market in the United States, a nation rich in dairy prod- 
ucts, animal fats, and vegetable oils. A new American whaling industry would 
have had to erter European markets more easily served by  the Norwegians, 
and a whole new marketing apparatus would have had to be built. Proctor and 
Gamble did make efforts to enter European markets, but the firm that came to 
occupy the key position as buyer and seller was the British firm Unilever. 
13.2  The Antarctic Hunting Grounds 
The search for new grounds took the whaling nations into the Antarctic. The 
British, by dint of exploration in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
by Cook, Colnett, Ross, Smith, Powell, Weddell,  and Briscoe, had claimed 
territories that were to be the  sites of  the first important group of southern 
shore-whaling stations. These territories, a set of islands and a promontory 
reaching out from Antarctica, encircled the Scotia Sea lying east and extending 
south of Cape Horn. They were called the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, 
and reading clockwise, starting at about ten o’clock, they were the Falkland 
Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands, South Orkneys, South Shet- 
lands (at about eight o’clock), and Graham Land, a peninsula stretching north 
from Antarctica to the South Shetlands.’* 
18. Subsequently, the British laid successful claim to the shores and islands of the Ross and 
Weddell Seas, although they were increasingly unsuccessful at controlling whaling and raising 
revenues in these seas. 506  Chapter 13 
The early explorers reported large numbers of what they took to be right 
whales in this area and in the Ross and Weddell Seas, but no substantial efforts 
at hunting were made before the late nineteenth century, although considerable 
numbers of seals and elephant seals had been taken  by  the few vessels that 
passed through. In the early 1890s two parties of vessels, one Scottish and one 
Norwegian, independently  set out for Antarctica to capture the right whales 
that had been reported by those early explorers. No scientific expedition of any 
scope had  been  in the  area in almost fifty years; the voyagers of  1892 had 
little information on Antarctica, and what they did have was very old. The two 
expeditions found each other, but they found no right whales. Earlier explorers 
seem to have mistaken finbacks and blues for rights, and the two expeditions of 
the 1890s wanted nothing to do with rorquals. The Scottish party, in frustration, 
harpooned a blue, with the results described earlier in this chapter. Both parties 
gave up on whales and turned to sealing; in that activity they were quite suc- 
cessful (Chatterton 1926, 190-98). 
The reports of  rorquals attracted the attention of Foyn,  who proposed  an 
expedition to be financed by British capital and to use Norwegian techniques. 
Nothing came of this proposal, but the reports of the Scottish and Norwegian 
parties led to a series of scientific expeditions that further stimulated interest 
in the area. 
They did more than that. One of the scientific vessels, the Antarctica, was 
commanded by C. A. Larsen, an experienced Norwegian whaleman who had 
commanded one of the Norwegian vessels in the whaling venture of  1892. The 
Antarctica was caught in the ice of the Erebus and Terror Gulf and crushed.I9 
Larsen escaped and eventually fetched up in Argentina, where he was treated 
as a hero and where he found the financing for the first modern whaling voyage 
to Antarctica-that  is, the first Antarctic voyage in pursuit of rorquals. A li- 
cense to hunt was obtained from the British government, a shore station was 
set up on South Georgia, and a Norwegian steam catcher was purchased. The 
year was 1904 and the Antarctic was about to be opened to modem whaling. 
The significance of British occupation of the Falklands and Dependencies 
now became  clear. Moved  by  conservationist  motives,  the  British  governor 
general,  Sir William  Allardyce,  limited  the  number  of  licenses  awarded  to 
whalers, set rules (1908) encouraging  the use of all parts of  the whale (ob- 
taining oil from blubber, body, and bones; producing feeds and fertilizer from 
body  and  bones),  and prohibiting  the hunting of young  whales and whales 
accompanied by calves (Burton 1983, 161-62). Allardyce’s successors contin- 
ued his policies. 
The whalemen were thus under administrative constraints. Technology es- 
tablished a second constraint. Since carcasses had to be processed quickly lest 
the quality of  the oil deteriorate, the grounds that could be exploited from a 
given shore station were limited to those relatively nearby. Improvements  in 
19. The gulf was named after two British vessels in one of the early journeys of exploration. 507  Modern Whaling 
the speed and power of catchers expanded this area, but not without limit. 
The innovation of factory ships eased the technological constraint. Factory 
ships  were,  as their  name  implies,  whaling  stations  located  aboard  large 
freighters (eight thousand to thirteen  thousand tons). When the factory ship 
and its catchers moved into a hunting area, the catchers would bring whales to 
the mother ship, where they would be processed alongside. 
The use of factory ships did not entirely free whalemen from British control. 
Since processing could not be conducted at sea, a ship had to find a sheltered 
bay in which to operate, and so long as the bay lay within British territory- 
which was extensive-the  ship was, at least in principle, subject to British 
regulation. As compared with shore stations, factory ships had an important 
disadvantage. Despite their great size they did not have the space available in 
a shore station. Consequently, they were obliged to concentrate on obtaining 
oil; by-products, constituting substantial and growing shares of  the value of 
output of the shore stations, were left largely unexploited. As Bj@m  Basberg 
(1993, 157) puts it: 
From the beginning of Antarctic whaling  both  shore stations and floating 
factory ships were in use. In the first twenty years, up until around  1925, 
shore station whaling  was technologically  superior.  The ships could cer- 
tainly move from one catching ground to another, but they were dependent 
on sheltered waters where the whales could be flensed alongside and where 
they could find freshwater for the cooking operations. In reality . . .  the ships 
. . . operated in ways similar to the shore stations, but with more disadvan- 
tages-with  lesser  space both  for production  and  storage, more  clumsy 
freshwater supply etc. 
The factory ships now began to disengage from the land and to ignore Brit- 
ish regulations. The first step took place in 1924, when several factory vessels 
broke into the Ross Sea and found an extraordinary supply of  unusually fat 
whales,  chiefly blues. Working conditions were extremely difficult, because 
temperatures were so low-the  blubber of the dead whales froze solid and had 
to be hacked away with axes; the flensers more than once refused to perform 
in these execrable conditions and because of the profusion of ice floes, but here 
for the first time flensing was done on the ice, rather than in some sheltered 
bay.  Whalemen  soon found that whales were equally available and working 
conditions were better outside the Ross Sea, around the Balleny Islands. Very 
large amounts of oil were produced, despite the failure of the factory ships to 
convert as great a fraction of the oil contained in the blubber and bodies of 
these whales as shore stations commonly did. 
These ventures into the Ross Sea expanded knowledge of the Antarctic and 
stimulated further scientific interest in the continent. There had been a regular 
interplay between whaling ventures and scientific expeditions since the early 
nineteenth century, and scientific activities expanded until in 1912 the Amund- 
sen and Scott expeditions both reached the South Pole. By 1925 whalers had 
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Innovations that date from the 1920s strengthened the move to pelagic whal- 
ing. Chief  among them was the  stem slipway, an inclined plane descending 
from the main deck of the factory ship to the water. A captured whale could be 
brought to the slipway by  the catcher and hauled by its flukes onto the main 
deck, where processing would take  All the activities of a shore station 
were conducted on this enormous factory ship (thirteen thousand to sixteen 
thousand tons). The blubber was removed and tryed out; the flesh and bones 
were cut up, cooked, and pressed to obtain additional oil; and flesh and bones 
were ground up for animal feed and fertilizet2I Other innovations  were the 
freshwater evaporator, much improved cookers, and “separators and centrifu- 
gal machines which could separate the whale oil even in [a] rough sea” (Bas- 
berg  1993, 157). These factory ships were independent of the shore stations 
and therefore free of British regulation.22  The modern shape of  the industry 
was established. 
Four years after the invention of the stern slipway, the hydrogenation process 
was improved, so that whale oil, converted to a solid state, could be maintained 
at higher temperatures than formerly. The market for whale oil was augmented, 
as margarine could be made from whale oil alone, unmixed with other oils. 
The slaughter achieved unprecedented levels. “In  1925, when the Lancing 
[the first stem-slipway factory ship] made her first voyage, the total Antarctic 
catch was 10,488 whales. In  1931 it rose to 40,201” (Burton  1983, 165-66). 
Almost three-quarters of  this number were blue whales. In that one year the 
modem industry killed more than  10 percent as many whales as the American 
industry had destroyed in the entire nineteenth century. Well over  1,000,000 
whales were captured between 1904 and 1978, compared with something over 
350,000 during the nineteenth century (see chapter 4). 
The harvest in  1930-31  was so great that the market for oil was swamped, 
and fears were raised that the  whales would be driven to extinction. In the 
following season the Norwegian government declared a moratorium-well  ob- 
served by Norwegian  whalemen, but not by the English. Only seven factory 
ships operated in this year, compared with forty-seven the year before (Burton 
1983, 166). The number of Antarctic whales taken fell from 40,201 to 9,572. 
By now the structure of the whaling industry had changed importantly from 
what it had been in the days when the Finnmark ground was the chief source 
of  whales and the Scottish jute makers were the chief buyers of  oil. Further 
important changes were just over the horizon. 
In the early  1930s Norwegian  firms were  still predominant,  and Norway 
20. A device for hauling the whale aboard-the  Gjeldstad claw, a kind of enormous pair of 
pliers that grasped the flukes-was  patented in 193 1. A winch drew the claw and the whale up the 
slipway to the cutting-in station (Tennessen and Johnsen 1982, 706). 
21. The fraction of the total potential output from the whale that factory ships obtained still did 
not match the record of the shore stations. 
22. The British claimed the right to exercise controls in their territorial waters, and whalemen 
were initially inclined to accept the claim. But, as time passed, “pirate” voyages  increased in 
number and importance, and the British showed no strong disposition to stop them. 509  Modern Whaling 
supplied the lion’s  share of whaling crews, but other nations were becoming 
more important players. Of the total number of floating factories produced be- 
tween 1928 and 1940, fifteen were registered in Norway, ten in Britain, six in 
Japan, three in Germany, two in the United States, and one each in the USSR, 
South Africa, and Panama. Furthermore, many Norwegian firms got at least 
part of their finance from other countries, notably Great Britain and Argen- 
tina. In  1930-31  all Antarctic whaling crewmen were Norwegian,  while by 
1939-40 the figure had fallen to 59 percent; the Japanese alone accounted for 
28 percent of crewmen. The decline in the role of Norway was accelerated by 
disputes between the union representing Norwegian crewmen and their foreign 
employers, especially the British. Issues of nationality-always  of  some im- 
portance-were  becoming much more significant. 
As to markets, soap makers now took a substantial fraction of output, and 
one firm, British Unilever, was the chief buyer, both for itself and in its role as 
an international distributor. It was faced, across the market, by  a selling pool 
of Norwegian firms. Production of margarine expanded on the Continent, espe- 
cially in the Low Countries and in Germany. These were new and important 
markets that led to a reorientation of the whaling industry. 
The relations among the participants in these activities would provide mate- 
rials for an interesting set of studies in industrial organization and labor eco- 
nomics-also  in diplomatic history, since whaling firms were not reluctant to 
call for assistance from their governments, and governments heard these calls 
and acted on them.23  For example, the Norwegian government attempted to 
mediate between Norwegian whalemen and the British officials of  the Falk- 
lands and Dependencies; the Norwegian government also called for the mora- 
torium of 1931-32.  Late in the 1930s negotiations on quotas and hunting sea- 
sons-developed  for conservationist  reasons-were  carried out exclusively 
by governments. 
Industrial organization, labor economics, and diplomatic history are not of 
central concern to this narrative. Three major developments of the 1930s that 
border on these areas are important. First, the great international economic 
collapse had particularly devastating impacts on the prices of  raw materials, 
and public policies were adopted to protect European producers of raw goods, 
particularly agricultural goods. One such policy, widely adopted in Europe, 
promoted the interests of butter producers by discouraging the production and 
consumption of margarine.  In Germany, actions against margarine were in- 
tended not only to protect farmers, but also to save scarce foreign exchange 
and to enhance German self-sufficiency in preparation for the coming war. The 
problem  of  foreign exchange could be dealt with in another way,  however: 
Germany could acquire a whaling fleet of its own. This it did, and very cheaply, 
23. The requisite  support was not always forthcoming, however.  In  1931 a Norwegian firm 
instituted suit in English courts against Unilever over an oil contract. The Norwegians lost in 
King’s Bench and in the Court of Appeal, but won in the House of  Lords, to the tune of f447,160 
(plus costs) (Tonnessen and Johnsen 1982, 391). 510  Chapter 13 
by using economic pressure to force Unilever to finance the required vessels. 
German policy thereafter did not deter the hunting of whales.  The German 
fleet-along  with the fleets of Japan and the USSR-began  to shoulder aside 
the fleets of the old whaling nations, Norway and Great Britain. 
Second, the decade saw some serious efforts at conservation. Motives were 
mixed. Norwegian and English whalemen at the beginning of the decade- 
when they dominated whaling-attempted  to restrict hunting by  adopting a 
quota system and by limiting the duration and timing of the hunting season. 
Their immediate purpose was to deal with the glut in the market, but concerns 
were also expressed over the future of  whale  stocks and  thus  the future of 
whaling. Norwegian whaling was already constrained by domestic legislation 
with a conservationist bent, and the Norwegian whaling companies were at- 
tempting to internationalize the rules that bound them.24 
In the fall of  1931 a committee of the League of Nations reported a set of 
proposals for the regulation of whaling. Among them was a call to prohibit the 
hunting of right whales, as well as of lactating females and calves of any spe- 
cies. The proposals-which  in important respects paralleled Governor Allar- 
dyce’s rules-were  widely praised and assented to, although it is not clear that 
they altered whaling practices substantially. 
Third, the entry of  the Germans, Japanese, and Russians into the whaling 
industry made control more difficult than it had been when  virtually  all the 
hunters had been under Norwegian and English direction. Even in these earlier 
circumstances it was not easy to reach agreements and to police them. With 
the introduction of new hunters, each with somewhat different goals and per- 
ceptions, regulation became much more difficult to achieve. The English and 
Norwegians-particularly  the latter-accepted  quotas and short hunting sea- 
sons, while the new hunting nations-particularly  the Japanese-did  not. It is 
no surprise to find that the British and Norwegian  shares of the world catch 
declined through the 1930s, and the shares of the Japanese and Germans rose. 
As the  1930s wore on, the world economy began to recover, and recovery, 
by  raising  demand  and  encouraging  an  expansion  of  hunting,  promoted  a 
breakdown of regulatory agreements. A major break came between the hunting 
seasons of  1936-37  and 1937-38.  In the latter, 46,039 Antarctic whales were 
killed, the largest seasonal total in the history of whaling. In the following year 
the catch dropped precipitately,  even though the number of catchers on the 
ground was greater than the year before. The structure of the catch also shifted 
in  ominous  ways.  In  1938-39  the  share  of  blues-the  favored  prey-fell 
sharply; the  next year  the  share of  fins-the  next most favored-also  fell. 
24. The issues were more complex than this simple statement suggests. In  the Antarctic the 
English tended to be conservationist in the rules they laid down for hunters, and the Norwegians- 
hunting firms and government-argued  for a relaxation of  rules. The reverse tended to be true in 
the north. Each nation favored conservationist regulations in its own territories, but not in the 
territories of others. There were also differences within groups. For example, Unilever took the 
position that market forces would prevent the destruction of whale stocks, a view widely at vari- 
ance with that of the governors of the Falklands and Dependencies. 511  Modem Whaling 
Clearly, whale stocks were being seriously damaged (Tonnessen and Johnsen 
1982,390-413,457). 
13.3  World War 11, Postwar Controls, and the International 
Whaling Commission 
World War I1 temporarily reduced the slaughter. The effect was not immedi- 
ate. Until Norway was occupied by  Germany, the Norwegian fleet continued 
to operate, and the Japanese hunted extensively until Pearl Harbor. Even there- 
after they continued to hunt in their own territorial waters. To obtain high qual- 
ity, noncorrosive lubricating oil, sperm whales were taken throughout the war. 
Eventually, however,  the  whaling  fleets were  virtually eliminated. Factory 
ships were converted to freighters, catchers, to convoy patrol vessels. Losses 
were heavy. Most of  the factory ships and many of the catchers were sunk by 
German raiders and submarines, or they were worn out in service. The war 
gave all of the whale populations time to recover from the heavy prewar hunt- 
ing, but the recovery was by  no means complete. Whales are long-lived ani- 
mals that take years to come to sexual maturity (see chapter 4). For complete 
recovery, a moratorium of  one or two decades would have been needed; for 
some species even those intervals would not have been sufficient. 
With the war over, the whaling nations went back to hunting on a large scale. 
There were limited efforts at conservation. The International Whaling Com- 
mission (IWC) was formed in  1946, and the chief whaling nations agreed to 
adhere to the rules it laid down, but its techniques proved to be inadequate. 
The IWC was created to “preserve the stocks of  undepleted  species and 
permit the increase in numbers of those already depleted” (Small 1971, 175). 
The commission, although at first concerned only with Antarctic whaling, es- 
tablished minimum length requirements for the various species of whales, set 
opening and closing dates for the hunting season, and imposed national quotas 
and a limit on the size of the total catch. Originally seventeen nations signed 
the treaty, but most of  them did not engage in whaling on a large scale. In 
1978, for example, the Japanese and Russians between them took 80 percent 
of the catch of the member countries (Frost 1979, 38,39). 
Although  a  significant  improvement  over  previous  attempts,  the  IWC 
agreement had two serious flaws. First, since any member nation could exempt 
itself from an IWC regulation merely by raising an objection, each country had 
an effective veto over any new regulation. For example, in 1954 the commis- 
sion voted to prohibit hunting of the blue whale in a limited area in the Antarc- 
tic. A single objection from the Dutch doomed the regulation. Second, quotas 
were not defined for each species, but were set in numbers of  “blue whale 
 equivalent^."^^ This definition led to the progressive exploitation of one species 
after another as whalers concentrated “their efforts on the most valuable spe- 
25. One blue-whale unit = 1 blue whale = 2 fin whales = 2.5 humpback whales = 6 sei whales 
(Burton 1983, 167-68). 512  Chapter 13 
cies while leaving less valuable ones untouched. They hunted and killed the 
blue whale as long as possible and then shifted to the fin whale. When the fin 
whale  became scarce  they  concentrated  their  harpoons  on  the  sei  whale” 
(Small 1971, 182). Species quotas would have been a more sensible conserva- 
tion measure, but the member nations would not agree to such a change. 
By the early  1960s it became  apparent to almost everyone that Antarctic 
whales were seriously overhunted. The IWC commissioned a major indepen- 
dent study of the current stock of whales. The findings of the so-called Com- 
mittee of Three were so persuasive that over the next decade a series of more 
effective conservation measures were actually adopted. The blue whale was 
granted complete protection in 1965, species quotas were adopted in 1970, and 
a system to monitor each nation’s whaling activity was put in place. 
13.4  The End of Whaling? 
Whaling activity gradually declined, partly because stocks were so depleted 
as to discourage whaling, and partly due to conservationist activities. The in- 
tensity  of  opposition to whaling increased in the  1970s and the  1980s. One 
nation after another abandoned whaling, and the United States also banned the 
importation of whale products. In 1982 the IWC, now “comprising 36 govern- 
ments  representing  85%  of  the  world’s population,”  suspended  commercial 
whaling beginning in  1986 (Dolphins, Porpoises, and Whales 1991, lo). The 
IWC decision was followed, and at the beginning of  1992 Japan and Iceland 
were the only whaling nations. The Japanese claim that their hunting is moti- 
vated by  scientific, not commercial, considerations; this claim is not widely 
accepted outside of Japan. 
In July  1992 the Norwegians reversed themselves and reentered the ranks 
of the whaling nations. How far the actions of the Norwegians will influence 
other nations is not yet clear, nor is it certain how the stocks of whales will be 
affected (for a pessimistic view see Matthiessen  1995). As things stand pres- 
ently, there is no whale species-except  perhaps the right-that  is in danger 
of  extinction. The hunting of  grays has been suspended since 1946, and the 
eastern Pacific  population  has  fully recovered.  The blues,  humpbacks,  and 
bowheads-three  groups about which there was deep concern in conservation- 
ist circles only a few years ago-now  seem to be recovering, slowly but well. 
The bowheads are still hunted by Inuits, who do them little damage; the blues 
and humpbacks are currently hunted by no one. The hunting nations now re- 
strict themselves to fins, seis, minkes, and some of the smaller whales. None 
of these groups is currently endangered.26 
26. Various small riverine cetaceans are endangered. Their chief sources of difficulty are pollu- 
tion, loss of  habitat, and accidental death in fishing nets. The authority of the IWC over them is in 
question. Other small cetaceans-not  endangered-are  hunted by  the Japanese and the Faeroe 
Islanders (Dolphins, Porpoises, and Whales 1991, 6,9, 13,28, 35,41, 117, 249). 